Russia’s Cultural and Ideological Resistance to “Progressive” Globalism

Russia has positioned itself as a defender of traditional Christian values against what it (and many conservatives worldwide) see as the West’s aggressive export of secular progressivism. Laws against LGBTQ+ propaganda aimed at minors, emphasis on family and faith, and rejection of “woke” ideology are portrayed in the West as authoritarianism. In reality, Russia is pushing back against what many of us see as cultural degeneration sponsored by Western NGOs, foundations, and media.

Globalist institutions (UN, EU, World Economic Forum) promote a borderless, post-national, post-traditional worldview. Russia says no—and funds alternative voices in the Global South that also reject this model. The West’s elite cannot tolerate a major power openly modelling an alternative that prioritizes nation, family, and faith over gender ideology and climate eschatology.

Brussels’ Federalist Ambitions Required an External Threat

The EU has always struggled with legitimacy. It’s an unelected bureaucracy in Brussels pushing ever-deeper integration—common currency, common foreign policy, common army—while national populations resist. Nothing unifies fractious member states like a common enemy. After the Soviet collapse, Russia was weak and cooperative under Yeltsin. But when Putin stabilized the country and began asserting national interests, Brussels saw danger: a large, sovereign European power that refused to join the EU club on subordinate terms. Russia wanted a partnership of equals; Brussels demanded hierarchy. By framing Russia as the eternal “other”—autocratic, expansionist, Orthodox vs. secular-liberal—EU leaders could rally citizens around “European values” and silence Euroskeptics. Without Russia as the bogeyman, the whole project risks unraveling (see Brexit).

Energy and Economic Independence

Russia is one of the world’s largest energy exporters. For decades, Europe depended on cheap Russian gas, which underpinned industrial competitiveness (especially Germany). The globalist push for rapid “net-zero” transition threatens traditional energy industries and national energy security. Russia, by contrast, leverages its hydrocarbon wealth without apology. When Russia refused to play along with Western sanctions and green mandates, and when Nord Stream pipelines were destroyed (still no credible Western investigation), it exposed Europe’s energy vulnerability. The West’s response—sanctions, price caps, seizure of Russian assets—looks less like principle and more like punishing a competitor who won’t submit to controlled de-industrialization.

The Energy Dependency Trap—and Deliberate Sabotage

For decades, Russian gas was the backbone of European industry. Cheap, reliable pipelines (Nord Stream 1 and 2) powered Germany’s manufacturing miracle and kept household bills low across the continent. Russia was a dependable supplier even during the Cold War. Brussels’ response? Push a “diversification” agenda tied to green ideology and anti-Russian politics. When Nord Stream 2 neared completion, the EU (with U.S. backing) imposed sanctions to delay it. Then came the 2022 explosions that destroyed both pipelines. No credible investigation from Brussels or Berlin, just shrugs and blame shifted to Russia (who had zero motive to blow up its own revenue stream). Europe voluntarily severed its cheapest energy lifeline, spiking inflation, de-industrializing Germany, and enriching U.S. LNG exporters. European citizens paid the price.

Ukraine as the Flashpoint: EU Overreach in Russia’s Backyard

The roots go back to 2013–2014. Ukraine was historically neutral, balancing EU and Russian economic ties. Brussels offered an EU Association Agreement that required Kiev to sever customs ties with Russia—effectively forcing a civilizational choice. Moscow countered with its own offer. When President Yanukovych paused the EU deal to study impacts, Brussels and Washington backed street protests (Maidan) that turned violent and ousted him.Evidence of Western involvement—U.S. officials like Victoria Nuland openly discussing who should govern post-coup, EU funding for NGOs—is public record. The result: civil war in Donbas, Crimea’s reunion with Russia, and a frozen conflict that Brussels escalated into full proxy war in 2022. Europe didn’t have to choose sides; it could have pushed Minsk agreements for federalization and neutrality. Instead, Brussels armed Ukraine, trained its forces, and blocked diplomacy—all to draw a new Iron Curtain.

Russia’s Challenge to Dollar Hegemony and Global Financial Control

The U.S. dollar’s status as global reserve currency gives Washington extraordinary power: the ability to weaponize finance through SWIFT exclusion, asset freezes, and sanctions. Russia has been the most prominent state pushing dedollarization—building alternative payment systems, increasing gold reserves, trading in local currencies with China, India, and others, and helping drive BRICS expansion.

Every time Russia trades oil in rupees or yuan, or when Saudi Arabia considers non-dollar sales, the petrodollar system takes a hit. The West’s elite—Wall Street, City of London, Davos crowd—depend on dollar dominance for their wealth and influence. Russia’s actions threaten that monopoly, so the response is financial warfare: freezing $300 billion in reserves, secondary sanctions, and endless escalations.

Sanctions as Self-Inflicted Economic Warfare

Since 2014, the EU has layered sanctions on Russia—freezing assets, banning tech exports, capping energy prices. The stated goal: cripple Russia’s economy. The reality: Russia’s GDP grew in 2024–2025, its budget is balanced, and it pivoted to Asia (China, India buying discounted oil). Europe, meanwhile, suffered recession, factory closures (especially German auto and chemicals), and inflation not seen in decades. Trade with Russia collapsed from €260 billion pre-2022 to a fraction today. Brussels even seized Russian central bank reserves—a precedent that terrified Global South nations holding euro assets. This wasn’t strategy; it was virtue-signaling that enriched defense contractors and U.S. energy firms while hollowing out Europe’s middle class.

Narrative Control: Manufacturing the “Russian Threat”

Brussels funds a massive information apparatus—think EUvsDisinfo, endless “fact-checking” initiatives—to label any skepticism as “Kremlin propaganda.” Media across Europe synchronized the message: Russia wants to conquer Europe, Putin is Hitler, etc. Dissenting voices (even mild ones questioning arms shipments) are smeared as “useful idiots.” This isn’t organic; it’s coordinated. Leaked documents show EU planning for “strategic communications” to sell the Ukraine war. Meanwhile, real threats—like energy insecurity caused by green policies or migration pressures—are downplayed. Russia became the perfect scapegoat to distract from Brussels’ failures: stagnant growth, democratic deficit, and inability to assert independence from Washington.

Hypocrisy and Elite Self-Interest

The West’s moral posturing rings hollow when you look at the track record: Iraq (WMD lies), Libya (turned a stable country into a failed state), Syria (backing jihadists against Assad), and endless color revolutions. Russia points this out relentlessly—and funds media and diplomatic efforts to amplify the counter-narrative in Africa, Latin America, and Asia, where the Global South increasingly sides with Moscow. The hatred isn’t really about Ukraine or “democracy.” It’s about Russia refusing to dissolve its sovereignty into the globalist framework. Putin’s Russia offers a model that prioritizes national interest over supranational agendas. In short, the West doesn’t hate Russia because it’s “authoritarian.” They hate it because it’s successfully independent. And independence is the one thing globalism cannot tolerate.

Written By Tatenda Belle Panashe

His comments were a direct response to a statement made just one day earlier by French President Emmanuel Macron, who announced that 26 countries had pledged postwar security guarantees to Ukraine. These guarantees include the possible deployment of an international force on land, at sea, and in the air to help stabilize Ukraine once active hostilities with Russia subside. While Macron emphasized that these forces would not be involved in frontline combat, but rather serve as part of a postwar “reassurance” presence, Putin made it clear that any foreign military presence on Ukrainian soil would be viewed as a hostile move by Moscow.

This rhetoric reflects Russia’s long-standing stance against NATO and Western military involvement near its borders, which it has often cited as a central reason for its invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Putin reiterated that foreign troop deployments would be unnecessary if a comprehensive and enforceable peace agreement is reached. He insisted that Russia would honor any treaty terms fully, suggesting that peace, not escalation, is in Russia’s interest though his warning makes clear that Moscow remains highly wary of what it sees as creeping NATO influence.

Putin’s statement is likely to stir further debate among NATO and European leaders, especially as they balance the need to support Ukraine with the risk of direct confrontation with Russia. The coming weeks will be crucial in determining whether Western nations follow through with their proposed postwar force, and how Moscow might react in practical terms.

‘The Resolution of the Russia/NATO Proxy War in Ukraine’; and despite the seemingly incongruous tones from various actors on in the year, there certainly has been a tremendous amount of progress made in the past few days – and we ought to address this first looking at the Putin-Trump Summit in Alaska. First, this Summit has the historic markings of the second Trump presidency in that this Summit orchestrated an event where Russian president Vladimir Putin landed in the United States for the FIRST TIME IN YEARS, reinforcing not only Trump’s commitment to peace, but also refuting the claim from other sects in the West that have claimed Putin was unwilling to use diplomacy (even with Ukraine’s western backers) towards ending the war. Meanwhile, the location of the summit – like that of most diplomatic summits – is not just a random scenic location, but was rather a calculated choice.

But, this commitment to peace through dialogue was perhaps further highlighted by the sentiments shared by Russian president Vladimir Putin, in stating that dialogue between Russia and the US was overdue, especially as there has been a need to move away from confrontation. Putin further re-echoed Trump’s sentiments, stating that the Ukraine conflict would have NEVER happened if Trump had been president in 2022; and also that the current situation in Ukraine is a tragedy and a deep pain for Russia; while also Russia agrees that Ukraine’s security must be ensured and stands ready to work on this through constructive dialogue.

Now, these sentiments underscore Russia’s commitment to diplomacy because the Alaska Summit was not a debut of this diplomacy-inclined commitment, and if anything these sentiments follow a long history of Russia’s willingness to prioritise diplomacy. You’d recall that we have discussed here on ‘The War Room’ the various times that Russia put diplomatic resolution of the conflict on the table. For instance, in June 2008, as the US prepared to expand NATO to Ukraine and Georgia, then Russian President Dmitry Medvedev proposed a European Security Treaty, calling for collective security and an end to NATO’s unilateralism. Suffice it to say, the US government at the time showed no interest whatsoever in Russia’s proposals, and instead proceeded with its long-held plans for NATO enlargement.

The second Russian proposal for negotiations came from Putin following the violent overthrow of Ukraine’s President Viktor Yanukovych in February 2014, with the active complicity if not outright leadership of the US government. In fact, the evidence of US complicity in the coup was almost overwhelming; as assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland was caught on a phone line in January 2014 plotting the change of government in Ukraine, meanwhile, US Senators went personally to Kiev to stir up the protests. But then on February 21 2014 the Europeans, the US, and Russia brokered a deal with Yanukovych in which Yanukovych agreed to early elections. Yet the coup leaders reneged on the deal the same day, took over government buildings, threatened more violence, and deposed Yanukovych the next day.

Then after the West reneged on that diplomatic resolution, in the course of 2014, Putin called repeatedly for a negotiated peace, and this led to the Minsk II Agreement in February 2015 based on autonomy of the Donbas and an end to violence by both sides. CRUCIAL TO NOTE is that Russia did not claim the Donbas as Russian territory, but instead called for autonomy and the protection of ethnic Russians within Ukraine. The UN Security Council endorsed the Minsk II agreement, but the US neocons privately subverted it. Years later, Chancellor Angela Merkel then blurted out the truth, which is that the Western side treated the agreement not as a solemn treaty but rather as a delaying tactic to “give Ukraine time” to build its military strength.

Following the definitive collapse of the Minsk II agreement, Putin again proposed negotiations with the US in December 2021. By that point, the issues went even beyond NATO enlargement to include fundamental issues of nuclear armaments. Step by step, the U.S. neocons had abandoned nuclear arms control with Russia, with the US unilaterally abandoning the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 2002, placing Aegis missiles in Poland and Romania in 2010 onwards, and walking out of the Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty in 2019.

Following this, the fourth offer of Putin to negotiate came in March 2022, when Russia and Ukraine nearly closed a peace deal just weeks after the start of Russia’s special military operation that began on February 24, 2022. Russia, once again, was after one big thing: Ukraine’s neutrality, i.e., no NATO membership and no hosting of US missiles on Russia’s border. Ukraine’s President Vladimir Zelensky quickly accepted Ukraine’s neutrality, and Ukraine and Russia exchanged papers, with the mediation of the Foreign Ministry of Turkey. Then suddenly, at the end of March, Ukraine abandoned the negotiations. UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson actually flew to Kiev to warn Zelensky against neutrality and the importance of Ukraine defeating Russia on the battlefield.

Then, we then saw Russia’s fifth offer of negotiations, explained clearly and cogently by Putin himself in his speech to diplomats at the Russian Foreign Ministry on June 14 2024. Putin laid out Russia’s proposed terms to end the war in Ukraine. Putin stated that “Ukraine should adopt a neutral, non-aligned status, be nuclear- free, and undergo demilitarization and de-nazification. He also added that “These parameters were broadly agreed upon during the Istanbul negotiations in 2022, including specific details on demilitarisation such as the agreed numbers of tanks and other military equipment. And this tone and willingness to prioritise diplomacy has been consistent from Russia, even as we now see more meaningful engagement from the West (in particular the US), since president Trump’s re-entry into office.

THE COMPARATIVE GAIN THAT CAME WITH THE PUTIN-TRUMP ALASKA SUMMIT

Evidently, the Putin-Trump Alaska Summit was not a debut of Russia’s diplomacy-inclined commitment, INSTEAD the sentiments shared in that Summit follow a long history of Russia’s willingness to prioritise diplomacy.

Now someone might ask: What then of Russia’s war effort, seeing as they have not stopped military operations, while uttering a commitment to diplomacy? And the answer to this is fairly straightforward. First, Russia has always been open to diplomacy, but they have shown that they are also prepared for military confrontations – afterall, good leaders prepare for war in a time of peace, and Russia clearly has done that. Secondly, Russia is not the only fighting party in the war, and so, its military operations must never be viewed in isolation from those of NATO and Ukraine.

Therefore, while Russia has been engaged in military operations, it nevertheless stands that diplomacy has always been a possibility with Russia, and the significance of the Putin-Trump Summit is that Russia not only has an opportunity to highlight this to the West and the world at large – particularly in a joint summit with president Trump who has shown a willingness to prioritise diplomacy in resolving this conflict as well; BUT this is also being done in collaboration with the US, which in previous administrations had served a neo-con agenda on undermining diplomacy to pursue NATO’s expansionist goals. Which then means that the Putin-Trump Alaska Summit has presented a comparative gain or advantage in such a way that we are seeing parties with a considerable influence on the resolving of this conflict make a joint commitment to diplomacy – first because Russia has always committed to this, and second because Trump is discontinuing the war-inclined policy of previous US administrations with his commitment to peace. And this is why I found it quite crucial that Putin then highlighted a hope that mutual understanding with Trump will pave the way for peace in Ukraine, and thus urged Kiev and Europe not to hinder the emerging progress in resolving the conflict.

THE WHITE HOUSE MEETING BETWEEN TRUMP AND ZELENSKY 

Let’s proceed to discuss the meeting at the White House, between president Trump and Ukrainian president Zelensky. And in a notable contrast to the meeting between Trump and Zelensky at the White House earlier this year, president Trump expressed a general tone of optimism in resolving the conflict. He emphasised good progress towards finally ending the conflict, as both Putin and Zelensky want to resolve it; and stating that European leaders also want peace.

Now, in terms of the specific details and the comparative analysis between this meeting and previous ones, a number of things stand out. First, president Trump articulated that NATO will cover the costs of US weapons for Ukraine. This is an incredibly strategic position as far as US involvement is concerned, because it builds on the principles that informed the minerals deal that was offered to Ukraine, in that the minerals deal is an agreement that would give the US access to Ukraine’s deposits of rare earth minerals, with the intention to help US taxpayers “get their money back” for aid sent to Ukraine throughout the war. And so, similarly, Trump is saying if the US will offer assistance in the form of weapons to Ukraine, someone has to pay for this immediate transaction, as opposed to keeping that burden on US taxpayers.

And – by the way – this is a message that Trump has promulgated since July; you’d recall that in his meeting with the NATO Secretary General, president Trump confirmed even then that NATO will be handling ALL OF THE COSTS of any defensive or offensive weapons being sent to Ukraine. And so, as US Ambassador to NATO Matt Whitaker put it: “The days of the United States sending unlimited taxpayer dollars to defend Ukraine are over. Europe and Canada will pay for the weapons; and the United States will manufacture them.”

Now, what also stood out in the meeting between presidents Trump and Zelensky is that much like was agreed between Putin and Trump, the subject of Ukraine’s security is deemed paramount. And so, in the meeting with Trump and Zelensky this was re-echoed, as Trump highlighted that Ukraine will get “good” protection, HOWEVER, this does not appear to be hinged on Ukraine joining the NATO, alliance as NATO aspirations were not discussed, and security guarantees will also be revealed later.

While seemingly inconclusive, this is actually a very strategic direction, because the one consistent point from Russia regarding the relationship between NATO and the West is that Ukraine cannot have NATO membership; that would be the final line crossed in NATO’s agreement not to expand eastward part Germany, enabling it to surround Russia’s naval fleet at Sevastopol. And so, not only is it plausible that the talks between Trump and Zelensky did not make Ukraine’s NATO membership central to a resolution, but this must actually be refuted going forward, because ironically, it would serve to fuel perpetual strife between the two nations. Again, the Cuban-missile crisis serves as the perfect case study.

But, ultimately, there is a concession on security guarantees, which will be discussed more in future, including the exchange of prisoners, and here’s more on this and the plan to set up a meeting between the US, Russia and Ukraine as president Trump gave Zelensky the opportunity to reveal what was discussed in their meeting.

THE QUESTION ON TERRITORIAL CONCESSIONS RE-EMERGED

Then, the question on territorial concessions re-emerged once again. In particular, Zelensky gave no clear answer on territorial concessions. But, the consistent tone from the liberal side of this discourse has doubled down on the claim that territorial concessions cannot be part of a peaceful resolution. In fact, this sentiment dates back to the previous NATO regime under Jens Stoltenberg, where they very audaciously rejected a peace deal on behalf of Ukraine because they were not keen on territorial concessions.

Now, we’ve spoken extensively about this matter on territorial concession. On the one hand, I believe the Donbas and Crimea have a legal and democratically expressed claim to independence or session from Ukraine – based on the referendums that took place with majority votes in support of sessions or a Russian identity. Secondly, if you caught the Sunday Podcast with Tatenda Belle Panshe and myself, you would have caught her remarks on there generally being an understanding that territories that are lost in war tend to go to the victor, and so that principle stands even in the status quo. Which is quite fair because Russia is not stealing these territories, they successfully made military advancements and thus have broader control in those areas, especially the southern Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions.

Then on the other hand, here is the nuance that I think lies embedded in the discussion on territorial concessions: at the centre of this appears to be a means for the West to have a justification for their claims of Russian aggression or expansionism; because otherwise, Russia is not that villainous an actor, and they actually are not fighting Ukraine for land (like the West has claimed for the longest time); and are RATHER actually just fighting to keep NATO away from their border, while protecting ethnic Russians in Ukraine. And so, the discourse on land concessions is not about Ukraine’s sovereignty, but about clinging to shreds of the political legitimacy they tried to stir for this proxy war they started.

This is why at the NATO Summit in 2024, then US president Joe Biden said that Russian President Vladimir Putin “wants nothing less than Ukraine’s total subjugation… and to wipe Ukraine off the map.” The Declaration goes further, saying that NATO is “determined to constrain and contest Russia’s aggressive actions and to counter its ability to conduct destabilising activities towards NATO and Allies.” HOWEVER, Putin has insisted that “this conflict is not about territory” but about security arrangements, a claim that is consistent not only with Russia’s stated war goals, but with the limited number of troops Russia committed to Ukraine. Those troops, according to Putin, “were there to push the Ukrainian side to negotiations,” and their numbers only grew after the West intervened to block those negotiations.

There is no evidence in the historical record that Russia intends to conquer all of Ukraine or to “wipe Ukraine off the map.” So much so that Ukrainian officials involved in the Istanbul negotiations with Russia confirm that Russia’s key demand in ending the war was a written promise that Ukraine would not join NATO. Not to mention, if Russia had wanted to conquer more Ukrainian land, they had the ability and the means in 2014 when Putin had a mandate from the Russian parliament to use military force in Ukraine, not just Crimea! Russia could have annexed the Donetsk and Lugansk regions that same year when they voted for autonomy, but Putin neither pre-maturely or abruptly recognised the results nor acted on requests to accept the regions as part of Russia. In addition, Russia could have, in 2008, incorporated Georgia when they had the opportunity to do so or even recognised the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and then annexed them. But, again, Putin did not. In fact, right up until the start of the Russian special military operation in Ukraine, Putin remained committed to the Minsk II Accords and was still urging France and Germany to pressure Ukraine to implement them. That solution would have left an autonomous Donbass in Ukraine.

Therefore, we must not let people who are bent on sustaining this proxy war pretend that the lack of land concessions from Ukraine is the pinnacle of resistance to Russian expansionism – emphatically no. All this is is NATO needing a win, because they otherwise have to reckon with the fact that they lied about Russian aggression and also that Russia beat Ukraine despite their assistance. Which is precisely why this is a proxy war between NATO and Ukraine, and why Russia must focus on ending the war directly with NATO as well.

THE QUESTION ON UKRAINIAN ELECTIONS

Now, regarding elections in Ukraine – which are long overdue – Zelensky stated that elections would be possible only under security conditions. However, the presidential term of the head of Ukraine has run out, and Zelensky is no longer a legitimate President according to the Constitution of Ukraine. Secondly, a significant number of Ukrainians want a restoration of constitutional order and the implementation of their right to have elections. This is an important consideration – especially in light of what the reconstruction period will look like in Ukraine after the war has ended.

Written By Lindokuhle Mabaso

Qingdao — China hosted high-level defence talks this week with key members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), welcoming top military officials from Russia, Iran, India, and Pakistan as the group seeks to present itself as a stabilizing force in a rapidly polarizing global security landscape.

Held in the eastern coastal city of Qingdao, the SCO defence summit was chaired by Chinese Defence Minister Dong Jun, who called for “fairness, unity, and strategic trust” among regional powers. The meeting came just days after the NATO summit in The Hague, where Western leaders committed to expanded military budgets and deeper Indo-Pacific engagement moves that Beijing has long viewed with suspicion.

Russia Warns of “Mercenary Flood” in Europe

In one of the summit’s most pointed remarks, newly appointed Russian Defence Minister Andrei Belousov accused the West of escalating the Ukraine conflict through what he termed the “flooding” of the region with weapons and foreign mercenaries.

“The increased militarization of Ukraine by NATO countries is not only prolonging the conflict but destabilizing all of Europe,” Belousov said, warning that continued escalation could have “long-term global consequences.”

Russia’s participation in the summit underscores its pivot toward Asia amid growing isolation in the West, with the SCO providing Moscow a diplomatic and security platform outside of NATO-dominated arenas.

India Pushes Counterterrorism Amid Regional Tensions

India’s Defence Minister Rajnath Singh used the forum to press for stronger counterterrorism coordination, referencing a recent militant attack in Kashmir that left at least 12 soldiers dead. Singh attributed the assault to Pakistan-based groups and urged SCO partners to adopt a “zero-tolerance policy” toward terrorism.

“Terrorism in any form, backed or harbored by state or non-state actors, remains the single most serious threat to peace and stability in our region,” Singh said during his remarks.

The Indian delegation’s firm tone highlighted ongoing tensions with Pakistan, which also attended the summit. While Islamabad did not issue a direct response, its representatives reiterated a call for “cooperative security frameworks” and respect for sovereignty.

China Seeks to Lead Alternative Security Vision

China, the rotating host of the 2025 SCO cycle, used the summit to position the organization as a counterweight to Western-led military alliances, particularly NATO. Minister Dong Jun stressed that the SCO stands for “non-aligned, non-confrontational, and inclusive security cooperation” and pledged to deepen defence ties across member states.

“The world is not governed by one bloc’s rules or interests,” Dong said. “The SCO promotes fairness, multilateralism, and the peaceful resolution of disputes.”

Analysts say China is increasingly leveraging the SCO to build a coalition of like-minded powers opposed to what they see as U.S.-dominated global institutions.

SCO’s Expanding Influence

Founded in 2001, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation now includes nine full members: China, Russia, India, Pakistan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. With observer states such as Belarus and dialogue partners like Turkey and Saudi Arabia, the SCO’s security footprint continues to grow, particularly in Central Asia.

This year’s summit focused on joint border security drills, intelligence sharing, cybersecurity defense, and preventing regional spillover from Middle Eastern and Eastern European conflicts.

As tensions grow between NATO and non-Western powers, the Qingdao summit marks a renewed effort by China to promote a “multipolar security order” that contrasts with what it describes as Western militarism.